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RANDOM DRUG TESTING FOR 
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES: 
HAS THE SUPREME COURT OPENED PANDORA'S BOX 
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 
Ralph D. Mawdsley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Statistics suggest high rates of drug use among junior high 
and public high school students. 1 Even more alarming figures 
from the Department of Health and Human Services reveal 
that one-third of all students have used illegal drugs before 
completing the eighth grade and more than half before 
completing high school. 2 Apart from illicit drugs, 50.5% of 
youth reported having tried alcohol (more than a few sips) by 
the eighth grade, and 23.4% said they had already been drunk 
at least once.3 Moreover, students who smoked cigarettes were 
more likely to use illicit drugs. 4 With the number of teens 
expected to increase from 23.6 million in 2000 to 25 million in 
2010,5 the number of students participating in drug use can be 
expected to increase even if the percentage of use does not. 
* Ralph D. Mawdsley is a Professor of Educational Administration at Cleveland 
State University in Cleveland, Ohio. He received his J.D. from the University of 
Illinois and his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Mawdsley teaches courses 
in school law, special education law, and sports law. He has published more than 250 
articles and books on numerous legal issues in the field of education. 
1. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1280 (lOth Cir. 2001) (Ebel, J., 
dissenting) (18.4% of twelve to seventecn-year-olds have used marijuana or hashish in 
their lifetimes; 10.9% of twelve to seventcen-year-olds currently use illegal drugs; and 
over half of marijuana first-time users and cocaine first-time users are between the 
ages of twelve and seventeen). 
2. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 U.S. 2559, 2570 (2002). 
3. See Ofi of Nat!. Drug Policy, Juveniles and Drugs <http://www .whitehouse 
drugpolicy.gov/drugfact/juveniles/index/html> (last updated Dec. 19, 2002). 
4. ld. 
5. Commn. on Substance Abuse Among America's Adolescents, Substance Abuse 
and the American Adolescent (Aug. 1997). 
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Beyond the general statistics of drugs among school-age 
young people is the perception of drugs on school campuses. 
The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
(CASA) reported in its 1997 survey that 76% of high school 
students and 46% of middle school students said that drugs 
were kept, used, or sold on school grounds. 6 The CASA survey 
revealed a dramatic difference between the perceptions of 
students and teachers. 7 While 18% of middle school and 41% of 
high school students reported seeing drugs sold at school, only 
8% of middle school teachers, 12% of high school teachers, and 
14% of principals saw drug sales. 8 The challenge for school 
officials is how to address a problem that national statistics 
indicate is widespread among junior and senior high school 
students but which may not be apparent to school officials. 
One way to address drug use in schools is drug testing of 
students. The Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Earls 
(Earls), 9 opened the door to allow public schools to engage in 
suspicionless random drug testing of students participating in 
extracurricular activities. Whether drug testing will be a 
panacea or a Pandora's Box for public schools is not clear. Any 
school expecting that the use of random drug testing will deter 
or excise student drug use needs to consider a number of legal 
issues. The purposes of this article are to review the various 
drug testing approaches that school districts have taken to 
address drug use, examine the legal challenges that have 
resulted, and consider legal issues related to the design and 
implementation of a drug testing policy. 
II. SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING 
Assuming that states do not mandate or prohibit random 
drug testing, the decision to randomly drug test is one that will 
be left to individual school districts. However, such a decision 
requires consideration of a minefield of legal problems. 
Suspicionless drug testing can involve testing all or a 
random sample of students. In Vernonia School District v. 
6. Natl. Ctr. on Addiction & Substance Abuse, 1997 Back to School Survey 




9. 122 S. Ct. 2559. 
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Acton (Vernonia), 10 the Supreme Court addressed a school 
district policy that included both kinds of testing for students 
participating in interscholastic sports. All students were tested 
at the beginning of their sport's season, and thereafter, ten 
percent of the students were selected randomly to be tested 
each week of the season.l 1 
It is debatable whether the purpose of the district's policy in 
Vernonia of deglamorizing drug use 12 was consistent with the 
policy's implementation. Despite widespread evidence of drug 
abuse throughout the student body,13 the district's policy was 
directed narrowly at only athletes "where the risk of immediate 
physical harm to the drug user and those with whom he is 
playing his sport is particularly high." 14 The list of drugs for 
which student athletes were tested (amphetamines, marijuana, 
and cocaine), 15 while harmful to athletes, did not include 
anabolic steroids, which pose a higher risk of harm to athletes 
than the drugs included in the test. 16 While questionable, the 
omission of anabolic steroids from a drug test of athletes might 
still be reasonable if the purpose of the drug testing was to 
prevent drug use among the student body in general. Its 
absence in the Vernonia School District's drug testing policy 
suggests that athletics was only a convenient vehicle to 
attempt to address a broader school-wide problem. 
Arguably, the Vernonia School District's decision to 
randomly test athletes because they were "the leaders of the 
drug culture" 17 was more strategically formulated than policy-
driven. Given an earlier Supreme Court decision, New Jersey 
v. T.L.O. (T.L.0.), 18 that required individualized reasonable 
suspicion for searches of students, selection of a group limited 
10. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
11. Id. at 650. 
12. See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992) 
(students "glamorizing drug and alcohol use" was perceived as the cause of student 
rebellion and led to the district's drug testing policy). 
13. See id. at 1367 ("the glamorization and use of drugs and alcohol became more 
blatant" and resulted in increasing frequency of classroom discipline problems). 
14. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662. 
15. Id. 
16. See William N. Taylor, Anabolic Steroids and the Athlete (McFarland & Co., 
Inc. 1982) (greatest danger of anabolic steroids is to the liver with other side-effects 
including possible heart attacks, sexual changes, and mental disturbance). 
17. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649. 
18. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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to those participating in extracurricular sporting events 
presented a new, and more defensible 19 fact situation for 
suspicionless drug testing than was addressed in T.L.O. Had 
the School District in Vernonia chosen to require suspicionless 
drug testing for all students, the district would have placed 
itself in the untenable position of having to persuade the Court 
that a suspicionless exception to T.L.O.'s individualized 
reasonable suspicion was needed for all students. 20 
Despite permitting suspicionless drug testing for athletes, 
Vernonia left an unclear message concerning random drug 
testing, in general. How much evidence of drug use must a 
school have before it can use suspicionless random drug 
testing? And, can a school's desire to deter drug use be a 
sufficient basis to justify suspicionless testing? 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Earls v. Board of 
Education (Earls)21 addressed these questions for school 
districts. Following Vernonia, some school districts had 
extended random testing to a variety of other student settings, 
including non-athletic extracurricular activities, 22 students 
fighting, 23 students driving a car to school, and to include other 
substances, particularly alcohol and nicotine.24 
19. See Bush v. Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562 (D. Minn. 1990) (example of 
judicial support for discipline of athletes because athletics represents a privilege, not a 
right; mere presence of athlete at an off-campus function where alcohol was served 
could result in revocation of letter and suspension from competitions). 
20. That the T.L.O. majority required a reasonableness standard for student 
searches is highlighted by the dissenting opinion that views this standard as an 
unauthorized departure from the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341~43, 357~58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
21. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2559. 
22. See Gardner v. Tulsa lndep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000) 
(drug testing policy for all extracurricular activities that included 80% of students 
struck down because no evidence of drug-related referrals, increased use of drugs on 
campus, or rising tide of student drug use); but see Linke v. N. W. Sch. Corp., 763 
N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002) (extracurricular drug testing for students driving to school, and 
students participating in athletics, academic teams, student government, musical 
performances, drama, FFA, National Honor Society, and SADD upheld where survey of 
drug use in grades seven through twelve was higher than average; nine middle/high 
school suspensions and expulsions for drug use had occurred in the first year of the 
policy, and three high school students had died of drug abuse in the ten years prior to 
the policy). 
23. See Willis 11. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(court struck down policy requiring drug test for all student suspended for three or 
more days for fighting). 
24. See Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(court upheld policy for random suspicionless drug testing but invalidated policy as to 
testing for nicotine); Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp. v . .loy, 768 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. App. 
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Earls, three 
federal circuits had rendered decisions involving suspicionless 
random drug testing of all extracurricular activities. 25 In two 
post-Vernonia decisions, 26 Todd v. Rush County Schools 
(Todd) 27 and Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation 
(Joy), 28 the Seventh Circuit upheld extracurricular 
suspicionless drug testing policies. However, in Joy the court 
had second thoughts about its earlier decision in Todd because 
Todd had not utilized the three-part methodology of Vernonia 
that considered the nature of the students' privacy interest, the 
character of the intrusion, and the nature and immediacy of 
the governmental concern at issue. 29 Nonetheless, the Seventh 
Circuit felt compelled to follow the precedent of its earlier 
decision.30 The Eighth Circuit also upheld random testing in 
Miller v. Wilkes (Miller), 31 but its decision was later vacated for 
mootness.32 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision in 
Earls v. Board of Education, 33 declared random testing 
unconstitutional. 
2002) (policy was challenged under state constitution and state appeals court upheld 
testing policy as to drugs and alcohol, but not as to tobacco). 
25. See Gardner, 183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (federal district court ruled unconstitutional 
a random suspicionless drug testing policy of all students participating in 
extracurricular activities because there was no evidence of a major or widespread drug 
problem among students in general); Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (pre-Vernonia 
decision wherein the Fifth Circuit upheld, without opinion, a district court decision 
holding unconstitutional suspicionless drug testing of students wishing to participate 
in extracurricular activities). 
26. The Seventh Circuit upheld random urinalysis testing of athletes in 
interscholastic sports in a pre· Vernonia decision. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. 
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). The facts in Schaill mirror those later litigated in 
Vernonia. A high percentage of high school students were using drugs, athletes had 
diminished privacy, the school district had a legitimate interest in finding unlawful 
conduct, and the procedures established by the district minimized intrusion into the 
students' privacy. 
27. 133 F. 3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998). 
28. 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000). 
29. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55, 658, 660. 
30. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1066 ("the judges of this panel believe that students involved 
in extracurricular activities should not be subject to random, suspicionless drug testing 
as a condition of participation in the activity. Nevertheless, we are bound by this 
court's recent precedent in Todd."). 
31. 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999). 
32. To vacate means "to nullify or cancel." Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (Bryan A. 
Garnered., 7th ed., West 1999). 
33. 242 F. 3d 1264, rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2559. 
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Although the Supreme Court frequently grants certiorari to 
resolve disputes among circuits, it would be a strain to suggest 
that this was the reason for the Court's decision in Earls. The 
Seventh Circuit's limited support for drug testing and the 
Eighth Circuit's vacated judgment standing in stark contrast to 
the Tenth Circuit's strident opposition to drug testing'14 hardly 
represents clearly divided circuits. Arguably, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Earls has much more to do with the Court's 
support for the authority of states and their local school boards 
to determine educational policy for public schools than with 
resolving differences among federal circuits. 
A. Earls: Tenth Circuit Decision 
In Earls, the Tenth Circuit struck down a school district 
policy that was framed to allow performing random drug 
testing of students in all extracurricular activities35 but was 
actually limited in application only to those involving some 
aspect of competition and sanctioned by the Oklahoma 
Secondary Schools Activity Association.36 At the federal 
district court level, the court did not find evidence of "a drug 
problem of epidemic proportions, or a student body in a state of 
rebellion" (as in Vernonia), 37 but it did find "legitimate cause 
for concern," which, when combined with judicial notice of "the 
prevalence of illegal drugs in our society, including our schools" 
and the attendant "discipline problems, inattentiveness, and an 
atmosphere of disruption in the classroom," created a "special 
need" justifying random drug testing.38 The Tenth Circuit, 
34. The strident nature of the Tenth Circuit's decision is best reflected in that 
court's dissenting opinion that presaged the Supreme Court's opinion. The dissenting 
judge would have justified the random drug testing policy because when young people 
are more susceptible to peer pressure to use drugs, probable cause is not required in 
school settings under T.L.O., drug use by some students in a public school closed 
environment interferes with the rights of other students, and the Supreme Court in 
Vernonia vested in public schools the responsibility to protect the children entrusted to 
them. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1279-80 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 1275 (the substances tested for were amphetamines, marijuana, 
cocaine, opiates, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines). 
36. Id. Although the district's policy was not limited to competitive 
extracurricular activities, the district applied the policy only to such activities. One of 
the plaintiffs in the case was a member of the show choir, the marching band, and the 
academic team, and the other plaintiff desired to participate on the academic team. I d. 
at 1268. 
:37. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2000). 
38. ld. at 1287-88. 
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however, rejected the district court's finding of special need, 
and instead found that although some evidence of drug use 
existed in Tecumseh public schools, "use among students 
subject to the testing Policy was negligible."39 
In balancing the school district's interest in deterring drug 
use with the students' expectation of privacy, the court opined 
that the voluntary nature of extracurricular participation did 
not translate into diminished expectation of privacy where 
"participation in extracurricular activities . . . has become an 
integral part of the educational experience for most students."40 
However, extracurricular participants did have "a somewhat 
lesser privacy expectation than other students" because they 
"agree to follow the directives and adhere to the rules set out 
by the coach or other director of the activity."41 With regard to 
the health and safety issue that played a prominent part in 
Vernonia, the court found the district's argument inapposite for 
three reasons. First, only some of the extracurricular activities 
involved a safety issue comparable to athletics. 42 Second, some 
students who were involved in activities that did represent a 
safety risk, "such as working with shop equipment or 
laboratories," were not tested at all. 43 As the court observed, if 
the school district is concerned about safety, "it too often simply 
tests the wrong students."44 Third, the court disagreed with 
the district's argument that students in extracurricular 
activities were supervised less than students in the classroom 
because "there is an imperfect match between the need to test 
and the group tested."45 On a regular basis, students not 
involved in extracurricular activities had less supervision "in 
the hallways between classes, at lunch, [and] immediately 
before and after school while they are entering and leaving 
school premises," but they were not randomly tested. 46 
39. Id. at 1275 (much of the evidence was hearsay and anecdotal, but of 484 
students tested under the policy for the school years, 1989-90 and 1999-2000, there 
were only 4 positive tests recorded); see id. at 1273-75 for a recounting of the evidence. 
40. Id. at 1276. 
41. Id. 
42. See id. at 1277 ("It is difficult to imagine how participants in vocal choir, or 
the academic team, of even the FHA are in physical danger if they compete in activities 
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The Tenth Circuit majority, in applying the Supreme 
Court's balancing test in Vernonia, held that the school's 
interest in safety was outweighed by the students' privacy 
interest because there was no evidence of drug abuse among 
the group to be tested and the majority "[saw] little efficacy in a 
drug policy which tests students among whom there is no 
measurable drug problem."47 The dissenting justice in Earls 
vigorously disagreed with the majority's application of the 
Vernonia balancing test, arguing that, since students have 
diminished privacy expectations and have experienced only 
minimal intrusion on their privacy in providing a urine sample, 
the school's interest can be outweighed only if it is "truly 
insignificant," which was "clearly not the case."48 Nonetheless, 
the majority cast a sop to public school districts by noting that 
they do not need to "wait until [they] can identify a drug abuse 
problem of epidemic proportions before [they] may drug test 
groups of [their] students."49 However, the majority disavowed 
"any bright line mark concerning the magnitude at which a 
drug problem becomes severe enough to warrant a 
suspicionless drug testing policy,"50 thus leaving public schools 
with little practical guidance. 
B. Earls: Supreme Court Decision 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth 
Circuit. Writing for the majority,51 Justice Thomas concluded 
that the school's drug testing policy was "a reasonably effective 
means of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns 
in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use."52 
1. Majority Opinion 
The majority relied heavily on the Court's decision in 
Vernonia, and rejected plaintiffs' claim that "drug testing must 
47. /d. 
48. Id. at 1283. 
49. /d. 
50. ld. 
51. Tn addition to Justice Thomas who wrote the majority opinion, the other 
members of the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Breyer. Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor dissented in 
an opinion joined by Justice Souter. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in 
which ,Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Souter joined. 
52. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2569. 
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be based at least on some level of individualized suspicion."53 
The Court's threefold analysis considered the students' 
expectation of privacy, the "character of the intrusion" on 
student privacy, and "the nature and immediacy of the 
government's concerns."54 
First, with respect to the students' expectation of privacy, 
the Court found a diminished expectation of privacy for 
students in question, because, like the athletes in Vernonia, 
students in all extracurricular activities "voluntarily subject 
themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy ."55 
Although some of the clubs and activities involved "off-campus 
travel and communal undress," similar to Vernonia, the Court 
found more dispositive the presence of "rules and requirements 
for participating students that do not apply to the student body 
as a whole."56 
Second, considering the character of intrusion on student 
privacy, the majority found the district's intrusion to be 
minimal in this case. The majority relied on several factors to 
support this finding. First, the method of collection was 
virtually identical to Vernonia with the added privacy element 
that male students could produce their samples behind a closed 
stall. 57 Second, drug test results were kept in confidential files 
separate from a student's other educational records and were 
available only to school personnel on a "need-to-know" basis. 
Evidence that a choir teacher had looked at a student's 
medication list was not considered intrusive because the 
teacher would have had access to this kind of information prior 
to the drug testing policy, and, in any case, the teacher needed 
to know this information with regard to choir performances off-
campus. 58 Third, test results were not released to law 
enforcement authority and negative test results did not lead to 
school discipline or academic consequences. Finally, even the 
limitation on a student's "privilege of participating in 
extracurricular activities" was softened by a progressive 
penalty system.59 
53. ld. at 2564. 
54. ld. at 2566-{)7. 




59. ld. at 2567 (after a first positive test, the student could continue participating 
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Finally, the Court addressed the nature and immediacy of 
the government's concerns and found that it was based on the 
importance "in preventing drug abuse by schoolchildren ... [as 
reflected by a] drug abuse problem among our Nation's youth 
[that] has hardly abated since Vernonia was decided in 1995."60 
A "particularized or pervasive drug problem" is not necessary 
to justify a suspicionless drug testing policy.61 Because of "the 
nationwide epidemic of drug use," the Court considered that it 
made little sense "to require a school district to wait for a 
substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it 
was allowed to institute a drug testing program designed to 
deter drug use."62 
The Court rejected plaintiffs' claim that reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing should be required for drug testing, 
finding a number of problems that might be associated with 
such a standard. Not only would such a standard "place an 
additional burden on public school teachers," but it "might 
unfairly target members of unpopular groups."63 In addition, 
individualized suspicion could lead to the fear of lawsuits that 
"may chill enforcement of the program."64 
The Court instead stated that drug testing of students 
under the Fourth Amendment need only be reasonable and 
"does not require employing the least intrusive means."65 
Vernonia did not require that schools test the group of students 
most likely to use drugs, but instead evaluated drug testing "in 
the context of public school's custodial responsibilities."66 
if, within five days of meeting with parents, the student shows proof of receiving drug 
counseling and submits to a drug test within two weeks. After a second test, a student 
is suspended from participation for fourteen days and can return to participation after 
completing 4 hours of substance abuse counseling. Only after the third offense will a 
student be suspended from participation for the balance of the school year or eighty. 
eight days, whichever is longer). 
60. Id. 
61. ld. at 2568 (citing Natl. Treasury Employees v. Von Raub, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), 
in which the Court upheld drug testing for customs employees because government had 
a legitimate interest in testing employees in safety sensitive positions, namely those 
persons checking for drug trafficking). 
62. Id. at 2568. 
63. ld. at 2568-69. 
64. ld. at 2569. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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2. Breyer Concurring 
As the fifth vote for the majority, Justice Breyer's opinion 
does nothing to qualifY the constitutional position of the 
majority. Although he noted that there is no way of knowing 
whether the school district's drug testing program will work, he 
declared unequivocally that "the Constitution does not prohibit 
the effort."67 He underscored the reasoning of Justice Thomas 
by observing that the drug problem in schools is serious, 
emphasizing that supply side interdiction of drugs has not 
reduced teenage drug use. Accordingly, he emphasized that 
schools must find new and effective ways to fulfill their in loco 
parentis responsibilities, and the random drug testing policy in 
dispute provides students a non-threatening reason to decline 
drug-use invitations, namely, in order to participate in 
extracurricular activities. 68 
For Justice Breyer, the counterargument to alleged 
intrusion into student privacy is the democratic process that 
the school board engaged in that was designed to give the 
entire community the opportunity to develop the drug policy. 
The policy, as formulated, preserved the status of a 
"conscientious objector" for the student who does not want to 
participate in drug testing. While the student exercising this 
status pays a price in nonparticipation, that price is "less 
severe than [would be] expulsion from the school."69 
3. Dissenting Opinions 
In her two-line dissent, Justice O'Connor dissented for the 
same reason that she did in Vernonia, namely that that case 
had been wrongly decided. 70 And, even if Vernonia had been 
decided correctly, stated O'Connor, Earls did not meet the 
balancing test in that case. 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg provided the 
rationale for the four dissenters. She concurred in Vernonia, 
but with the caveat that "I comprehend the Court's opinion as 
67. ld. at 2571. 
68. !d. at 2570. 
69. ld. at 2571. 
70. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (O'Connor's argument 
is that, like Vernonia, suspicionless searches for students do not fit within "allowed 
exceptions ... where it has been clear that a suspicion-based regime would be 
ineffectual."). 
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reserving the question whether the District, on no more than 
the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine 
drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in 
team sports, but on all students required to attend school."71 In 
her dissent in Earls, Justice Ginsburg opines that the Court 
has stepped over the limit. 
Essentially, Justice Ginsburg's position is that Vernonia 
established a reasonableness test m determining 
appropriateness of intrusion into student privacy and the 
argument on behalf of the school district in Earls does not rise 
to that level. Students' presence in public schools and their 
voluntary participation in extracurricular activities are "factors 
relevant to reasonableness, but they do not on their own justifY 
intrusive, suspicionless searches."72 
Justice Ginsburg found the school district's policy provided 
no effort to tailor the testing to the population affected by the 
drug use, as had been the case in Vernonia where "sports team 
members faced special health risks and they 'were the leaders 
in the drug culture."'73 School district efforts to suggest safety 
problems with marching band members carrying heavy 
instruments, Future Farmers of America wrestling animals, 
and Future Homemakers of America working with sharp 
cutlery were met with Justice Ginsburg's whimsical references 
to "out-of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding 
tubas."74 
At the heart of the dissent was a concern that 
extracurricular activities, although voluntary, are "a key 
component of school life, essential in reality for students 
applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant 
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational 
experience."75 However, the result of the Earls drug testing 
policy would be that, "[e]ven if students might be deterred from 
drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it 
is at least as likely that other students might forego their 
extracurricular involvement in order to avoid detection of their 
drug use."76 Thus, pressed to its logical conclusion, the policy, 
71. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
72. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2573-74. 
73. ld. at 2577 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649). 
74. Id. at 2576. 
75. ld. at 2573. 
76. Id. at 2577. 
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according to the dissent, not only intrudes unreasonably upon 
student privacy, but also fails to deter drug use.77 
4. Analysis and Implications 
The Supreme Court in Earls, as it had done in its earlier 
decision in the session in Owasso Independent School District 
v. Falvo (Falvo), 78 stopped short of making educational policy. 
Just as the Court in Falvo did not rule that school districts 
should adopt peer-grading as a pedagogical strategy to enhance 
student learning, 79 so also the Court in Earls did not decide 
that schools should adopt random drug testing to deter or 
extirpate student drug use. In both cases, the Court simply 
removed potential federal statutory (Falvo - FERP A)80 and 
constitutional (Earls - Fourth Amendment) barriers to the 
creation of educational policy by school boards. 
Earls opens the door for more school districts to impose 
random drug testing on students participating in 
extracurricular activities. The case extended the class of 
students who can be randomly tested for drugs. In Earls, the 
Court upheld random drug testing for those students in 
extracurricular activities that are part of a state's 
interscholastic competition. Thus, drug testing in Earls 
includes not only the athletes who were approved for testing in 
Vernonia, but also the Future Farmers of America (FF A) and 
Future Homemakers of America (FHA), and, in addition, the 
show choir, the marching band, and the academic team in 
which the plaintiffs in Earls were interested. 81 
In the aftermath of Earls, what other refinements in the 
application of random drug testing could be made? Earls does 
not distinguish between curriculum and non-curriculum 
77. ld. 
78. Owasso lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo 122 S. Ct. 934 (2002) (in Falvo, a 
unanimous Court held that peer-grading did not constitute a violation of FERPA). 
79. ld. at 939 ("Correcting a classmate's work can be as much a part of the 
assignment as taking the test itself. It is a way to teach material again in a new 
context, and it helps show students how to assist and respect fellow pupils. By 
explaining the answers to the class as the students correct the papers, the teacher not 
only reinforces the lesson but also discovers whether the students have understood the 
material and are ready to move on."). 
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (FERPA provides students protection from 
authorized disclosure of personally identifiable information and provides parents 
access to a child's education records). 
81. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268. 
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related groups of students, but presumably, this distinction, so 
vital in determining applicability of the Equal Access Act 
(EAA), 82 could also apply to drug testing. Could a school 
district decide to limit random drug testing only to non-
curriculum-related groups? For example, could students who 
want to participate in a Bible club be required to submit to a 
drug test? Earls addresses only the issue of whether non-
athletic, extracurricular groups can be drug tested, not which 
groups can be tested thus leaving open the question of how 
schools might choose to define such groups. 
Presumably, in addition to curriculum-relatedness, other 
categories for random testing might include students who drive 
to school or students belonging to groups that have off-campus 
components. Earls appears to give schools freedom in defining 
the student groups to be tested as long as those groups are 
voluntary and governed by rules not applicable to the student 
body at large. Additionally, these groups would have to be 
chosen by criteria that are neutral, generally applicable, and 
not based on the expressive content of the student group.83 
These criteria, in part, reflect Justice Thomas' concern about 
not "target[ing] members of unpopular groups."84 
The requirement that a school district demonstrate a 
special need to support its drug testing policy, as had been 
done in Vernonia, seems to have dissipated in Earls. Evidence 
in Vernonia based on student drug use surveys85 and 
disciplinary referrals reaching "epidemic proportions"86 
indicated not only a drug culture, but also that the athletes, the 
82. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000) (EAA prohibits public schools from preventing 
student-initiated meetings in limited open forums "on the basis of the religious, 
political, philosophical, or other content of the speech" where any noncurriculum-
related student clubs are permitted to meet during noninstructional time). 
83. Preventing public schools from singling out particular viewpoints for different 
treatment has a recent history in the Supreme Court beginning with Lamb's Chapel u. 
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993), through Good News Club u. 
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). In a series of cases bordered by these two, the 
Court held that, under free speech, schools cannot treat groups differently based on the 
content of their message. In essence, the notion that categories must be neutral and 
generally applicable would apply to any objection based on discriminatory treatment. 
84. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567. 
85. The use of surveys has met with differing results. See e.g. Tannahill u. 
Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (a survey of 
students revealed that student drug use of drugs in the school was lower than 
stateside); Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272-74 (perceptions of faculty were not considered 
persuasive). 
86. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663. 
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groups eventually tested, were the leaders of that culture. In 
Earls this level of evidence was reduced to teacher testimony 
that "they had seen students who appeared to be under the 
influence of drugs and that they had heard students speaking 
openly of using drugs."87 Although the Court stated that this 
was "sufficient evidence to shore up the need for [the district's] 
drug testing program,"88 the Court's refusal "to fashion ... a 
constitutional quantum of drug use necessary to show a drug 
problem"89 suggests that the meaning of special needs was not 
the same in Earls as it had been in Vernonia. What is not clear 
is whether the new test in Earls provides a lower floor or 
simply eliminates the floor altogether. 
Arguably, Earls creates a new lower floor of evidence 
necessary to justify drug testing based solely on anecdotal 
evidence and teacher observations. However, it is equally 
arguable that the Court's reasoning suggests that no evidence 
is required at all. On one hand the Court defines its test as not 
requiring "a particularized or pervasive drug problem" before 
allowing suspicionless drug testing,90 but on the other hand the 
court finds support for drug testing in National Treasury 
Employees v. Van Raub (Van Raub). 91 In Van Raub, the Court 
upheld random drug testing for customs inspectors, not 
because there was particularized or pervasive evidence of drug 
use, but because custom inspectors, as those persons charged 
with preventing the flow of drugs into the country, can 
reasonably constitute a safety sensitive group that can be 
required to submit to suspicionless drug tests.92 More 
importantly, the Court in Earls cites Van Raub for the 
principle that drug testing can be done "on a purely preventive 
basis."93 Thus, it is unclear whether the Court's standard for 
87. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567. 
88. ld. at 2568. 
89. ld. 
90. !d. 
91. 489 u.s. 656. 
92. /d. at 67 4. ("[T]he almost unique mission of the [Treasury] Service gives the 
Government a compelling interest in ensuring that many of these covered employees do 
not use drugs even off duty, for such use creates risks of bribery and blackmail against 
which the Government is entitled to guard. In light of the extraordinary safety and 
national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to positions 
that require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances, the 
Service's policy of deterring drug users from seeking such promotions cannot be 
deemed unreasonable."). 
93. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2568. 
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use of a random drug test lowers the floor whereby schools 
must provide some evidence of student drug use (less than 
particularized and pervasive) or eliminates the floor altogether 
since the basis for testing can be purely preventive. 
Another question that Earls leaves unanswered is whether 
random drug testing could be extended to all students enrolled 
in a public school. In an earlier post-Vernonia but pre-Earls 
decision, Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District, 94 a 
federal district court struck down both a mandatory and 
random drug test policy for all students in grades six through 
twelve. The district court reasoned that "students subject to 
drug testing in the Lockney School District comprise a much 
broader segment of the student population than the group of 
student athletes in Vernonia. Their expectations of privacy are 
higher."95 If the Supreme Court were to decide a Tannahill set 
of facts now, it is likely that it would come to the same 
conclusion but for a different reason. The Court would 
probably defer to its earlier decision in T.L.0., 96 where it 
upheld an individualized reasonable suspicion standard for 
conducting student searches. 
Beyond the question of the appropriate standard for 
determining when drug testing is justified lies the 
consideration of how the results of drug testing should be used. 
Justice Thomas thought significant a part of the Earls policy 
that limited the results of testing to participation in 
extracurricular activities. Students in extracurricular 
activities who tested positive for drugs were not removed from 
school or reported to law enforcement authorities. Does Earls 
stand for the principle that the results of a suspicionless search 
cannot be used to remove students from academic classes or be 
reported to law enforcement? If so, does Earls apply only to 
drug testing or does it also include other forms of suspicionless 
searches, particularly metal detectors and canine sniffs? 
Even though evidence obtained in searches stemming from 
the use of metal detectors and sniffing dogs frequently leads to 
school discipline and law enforcement reporting,97 there is no 
94. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 919 
95. /d. at 929. 
96. 469 U.S. 325. 
97. See Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Tex. 
2001) (upheld expulsion of student that resulted from search of student's truck 
following alert from dog); Cmmw. v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998) (motion to suppress 
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reason to expect that Earls would be applied broadly to all 
suspicionless searches. While drug testing produces evidence 
of wrongdoing itself, a positive response to a metal detector or a 
sniffing dog forms the basis for a search based on 
individualized reasonable suspicion. It is this intervening 
individualized reasonable suspicion that differentiates the 
suspicionless use of metal detectors and sniffing dogs from 
suspicionless drug testing. 
A more senous effect of Earls is the use of state 
constitutions to challenge drug testing. Although Earls found 
random drug testing constitutional under the United States 
Constitution, there is no assurance that states will find the 
practice valid under their own constitutions. 98 Since the effect 
of the Earls decision is permissive only in terms of determining 
whether schools can use drug testing, states would still be free 
to interpret the practice in light of their own constitutions, in 
much the same manner that cases can be addressed under the 
Establishment Clause.99 The fact that some state courts have 
already found random drug testing to be a violation of their 
state constitutions probably suggests that this will be a 
litigation wave of the future. 100 Thus, after Earls, school 
denied for marijuana discovered in student's locker as result of reasonable suspicion 
search following an alert by a dog); People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. 1996) 
(motion to suppress denied for guns found on two students following alert by metal 
detector). 
98. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (court upheld testing policy as to 
drugs and alcohol, but struck down testing for nicotine under the state's constitution 
protecting liberty interests); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 40 P.3d 1198 (Wash. App. 
2002) (drug testing policy for athletes violated Fourth Amendment and state 
constitution where there was no state compelling interest); Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 
919 (random drug testing policy for students in interscholastic athletics violated state 
constitution where no evidence of student drug use and injury to athletes); Theodore v. 
Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d 652 (Pa. 2000) (random drug testing of students 
involved in extracurricular activities and driving to school invalidated under federal 
constitution); Trinidad Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998) (random drug 
testing policy for extracurricular activities unconstitutional under federal constitution 
as applied to marching band). 
99. See Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (Court 
upheld, against Establishment Clause challenge, state provision of assistance to blind 
student in a religious college). On remand, the state supreme court invalidated the 
assistance under the state constitution. Witters v. Commn. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 
(Wash. 1989). 
100. In cases where the constitutionality of random drug testing has been 
addressed only under the federal constitution, litigants may well revisit the issue 
under state constitutions. See Theodore, 761 A.2d 652 (random drug testing of students 
involved in extracurricular activities and driving to school invalidated under federal 
constitution); Trinidad, 963 P.2d 1095 (random drug testing policy for extracurricular 
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districts spared the time and expense of defending their 
random drug testing policies under the federal constitution 
may find that they have to make the same investment under 
their state's constitution. 
Two practical implementation questions left after Earls 
concern the relationship between school's authority to test 
versus parental control over their children and the cost of 
testing. In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer references 
the in loco parentis doctrine as providing diminished privacy 
rights to students and authorizing school officials to protect 
students. He concludes that, if public school officials do not 
carry out their responsibilities appropriately, "parents [may] 
send their children to private and parochial school [sic] instead 
-with the help from the State."101 
The assumption that parents will remove their children if 
schools do not test for drugs overlooks the argument that 
parents may choose to remove their children because the public 
school is randomly testing. In loco parentis can be a convenient 
legal fiction for public schools, 102 but school officials may find 
that they have exceeded the limits of that fiction by 
implementing a policy that some parents neither favor nor 
would authorize for application to their children. Justice 
Breyer's comments about the importance of a democratic 
process involving parents in designing a drug testing policy to 
the contrary, parents, as was evident in both Vernonia and 
Earls, are not likely to acquiesce in a policy that is 
fundamentally opposed to their views of child rearing or their 
views on drug use. As a result, as Justice Breyer pointedly 
notes, the possibility of voucher money from states may 
facilitate and accelerate the departure of students from public 
activities unconstitutional under federal constitution as applied to marching band). 
101. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2570. The reference to state help is to the Court's decision 
upholding the use of vouchers in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002). 
102. See generally Ralph Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interests, Ill. 
B.J. (Aug. 1973) (in loco parentis qualifies as a legal fiction because, while it purports 
to grant school officials the authority of parents to deal with students, the match 
between the two is not perfect. For example, parents do not have the authority to 
suspend or expel students that schools have, nor do schools share the immunity from 
civil lawsuits that parents enjoy). That in loco pa.rentis is not sufficient to justifY public 
school authority is reflected in T.L.O.: "Today's public school officials do not merely 
exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act 
in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies." T.L.O., 469 
U.S. at 336. 
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schools, 103 presumably to private schools that do not test for 
drugs. 
The second question, cost, may create even more of a 
limitation on the drug testing policies that can be realistically 
implemented without harming a school's ability to effectively 
operate. With public school districts struggling to meet 
operating expenses, how many could afford the cost of testing 
10% of their students per week, as was the case in Vernonia? 
If the average cost per test were $30, the cost of simply 
administering weekly drug tests would amount to $3,000 per 
week in a school of 1,000 students and approximately $108,000 
per year.I 04 
Of course, the school could lower the percentage or number 
of students tested each week, but at some point the number 
would become so low as to lose its deterrent value. In addition, 
students who may not feel singled out when they are part of a 
larger group selected for testing, may feel more vulnerable and 
isolated when they are part of a very small number. 
Consequently, school districts now permitted to randomly drug 
test must decide whether they will do so at the cost of lost 
dollars and the possible loss of students. 
Justice Ginsburg's concern about the relationship between 
the educational program of drug testing and student's resulting 
decisions to not participate in extracurricular activities is one 
that schools that choose to randomly test will also have to face. 
Will students, even if they know that extracurricular 
participation may be important to college admission, refuse to 
participate if they (and, presumably, their parents) object to 
random drug testing? If there can be a widespread acceptance 
among students of a drug culture, as had been the case in 
Vernonia, it seems just as possible that there could be a 
widespread rejection of extracurricular participation if drug 
testing is required. 
Whether excluding or discouraging students from 
participating in extracurricular activities results in harmful 
103. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (Court upheld a state voucher plan that provided 
low income families with tuition money to attend other public and nonpub1ic, including 
religious, schools). 
104. Drug testing typically costs $70,000 per year for weekly random tests of 75 
students. Dana Hawkins, Trial by Vial, U.S. News & World Rep. 73 (May 31, 1999). 
See also George Dohrman, War on Drugs Only a Skirmish, L.A. Times C-6 (Jan. 25 .. 
1996) (in part discussing the cost of drug testing). 
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effects for students is a matter of dispute. Some studies have 
suggested that, among certain student populations, 
participation in extracurricular activities may diminish the 
drop-out rate and criminal behavior of high-risk students, 105 
while other studies have found no connection. 106 Even if 
students do not participate in public school activities, they may 
find alternatives to make themselves attractive to colleges and 
universities by participating in community service activities. 
In any event, Justice Breyer's idea of a democratic process in 
formulating a drug testing policy will probably go a long way in 
building community support; however, schools may find that 
this process will need to be ongoing to address the concerns of 
evolving groups of parents. 
C. Drug Testing Policies: Procedures and Rationale 
Although one cannot predict how many public schools will 
begin drug testing now that it is constitutionally permissible, 
school boards that want to use random testing need to consider 
carefully the policy they develop and follow. A drug testing 
policy developed by a school district should account for ten 
separate elements that have been addressed in federal and 
state cases addressing random testing: (1) rationale for testing; 
(2) statement of the substance(s) for which students will be 
105. See Joseph Mahoney, School Extracurricular Activity Participation as a 
Modemtor in the Development of Antisocial Patterns, 71 Child Dev. 502 (2002) (in a 
long-term longitudinal study of 695 boys and girls interviewed from childhood through 
high school and again at ages twenty to twenty-four, participation in extracurricular 
activities was associated with reduced rates of early dropout and criminal arrest 
among high risk boys and girls, but the decline in antisocial behavior was dependent on 
whether the students' social network also participated in extracurricular activities). 
However, the conclusion of the author is somewhat ambivalent: "The issue seems to be 
what the adolescent is participating in and with whom. The success of extracurricular 
activity participation may lie in its emphasis on structured, progressive skill 
development that is inherently interesting to the participant and directly related to 
conventional values." Id. at 514. For an article suggesting higher retention rates among 
Hispanic students involved in extracurricular activities, see Deanna B. Davalos et al., 
The Effects of Extracurricular Activity, Ethnic Identification, and Perception of School 
on Student Dropout Rates, 21 Hispanic J. of Behavioral Sci. 61 (1999). 
106. Not all studies have found a positive benefit related to student participation 
in extracurricular activities. See T. Andersson, Developmental Patterns and the 
Dynamics of Alcohol Problems in Adolescence and Young Adulthood 377-391 (as cited 
in Developmental Science and the Holistic Approach (L.R. Bergman, R.B. Cairns, L.G. 
Nilsson & L. Nystedt eds., Lawrence Erlbaum 2000)); G.J. Botvin, Substance Abuse 
Prevention Through Life Skills Twining 215-40 (as cited in Preventing Childhood 
Disorders, Substance Abuse and Delinquency (R. D. Peters & R. J. McMahon eds., Sage 
Publications 1996)). 
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tested; (3) designation of school activities covered by drug 
testing; (4) requirement of a consent form; (5) procedure for 
determining how students are to be selected randomly; (6) 
procedure to be followed in collecting the sample for the 
substance(s) prohibited by the policy; (7) the tests to be used as 
determined by the substances to be tested; (8) report of positive 
test results to appropriate school officials; (9) defenses 
available to students testing positive; and, (10) and penalties 
for students testing positive. 
1. Rationale for Random Testing 
Even though the Supreme Court in Earls suggests that 
deterrence of drug use among students is a sufficient basis for 
a random drug testing policy, school boards are probably better 
served to assert additional reasons in support of their drug 
testing policies. Hopefully, not many schools will have to 
declare, as the school did in Vernonia, that a crisis situation 
exists with some or all students in extracurricular activities 
involved in the drug culture.107 Since Vernonia, courts have 
struggled with the nature of a "special need" that must be 
shown to justifY testing a portion of the student population. 108 
This struggle has been lessened by the decision in Earls that 
lowered the degree of need from what Vernonia previously held 
must be demonstrated. 
The kinds of statements that will probably suffice after 
Earls may include assertions of student involvement with 
prohibited substances based on teacher observations and 
surveys109 as well as the effect of those substances on student 
107. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649 ("athletes were the leaders of the drug culture ... 
[and] [d]isciplinary actions had reached epidemic proportions"). 
108. See e.g. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 661 (court found no "special need" to test only 
extracurricular activity students and compared the school's approach to concern for the 
health of those students as "offering a polio vaccine only to those students engaged in 
extracurricular activities"). 
109. See e.g. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1310 (pre-Vernonia random testing policy tests of 
athletes indicated that 5 of 16 produced positive results of marijuana); Todd, 133 F.3d 
at 985 (pre-random testing policy survey indicated that student use of alcohol and 
cigarettes was higher than state average; although marijuana use was lower, school 
had witness testimony that drug use was increasing); Joy, 212 F.3d at 1064 (school had 
no evidence of a correlation between drug use and extracurricular activities or driving 
to school). See also Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (statewide survey of sixth, 
eighth, tenth and twelfth grade students in 1993, 1995, and 1997 indicated that the 
school system was "much more likely" than the national average to use "gateway 
drugs," defined as alcohol and tobacco, and had a "higher than average use" of "most 
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performance. Such evidence may include not only statements 
about the obvious risk to athletes of "impairment of judgment, 
slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain" 110 
and the risk to those driving to school, 111 but also less obvious 
statements, as in Earls, about "band members perform[ing] 
routines with heavy instruments and FFA members ... 
wrestl[ing] animals."112 However, this discussion of 
participation and risk level will necessarily be limited since the 
risk levels in some extracurricular activities may be highly 
attenuated.l 13 
Generally, students in extracurricular activities have been 
considered leaders with high visibility in their schools, an 
argument that clearly applies to athletes with lesser 
application to other student organizations, and, as the 
argument goes, with that leadership comes a need for 
"undermining the effects of peer pressure by providing a 
legitimate reason for students to refuse to use illegal 
drugs .... "114 In addition, as the Supreme Court of Indiana 
reflected in upholding random drug testing in Linke, most of 
the extracurricular activities have off-campus components and 
school officials "need a broader range of tools to insure 
compliance with its rules when activities occur off campus," 115 
an argument that may be deceptively simplistic since most 
academic classes may also have field trip components.U6 In 
any event, the main support for applying testing to all 
extracurricular activities relies on the voluntary nature of 
participation and, thus, a voluntary subjection by students to 
rules and a measure of control that extends beyond that in 
academic courses. 117 
other types of drugs"). 
110. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662. 
111. See Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 984. 
112. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277. 
113. As the Tenth Circuit points out in Earls, some extracurricular activities, such 
as vocal choir and the academic team represent no more risk of injury than in regular 
academic classes. ld. 
114. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 986. 
115. ld. at 984. 
116. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277. 
117. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2566; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. 
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2. Statement of Substances Tested 
Generally, drug testing policies test for illegal drugs and 
misused prescription drugs, such as "amphetamines, 
barbiturates, benzodiazepines (such as Valium and Librium), 
cocaine, opiates, PCP, and marijuana."118 Included in the 
testing could be the metabolites119 of these drugs. 120 Several 
school district policies have provided for the testing of tobacco 
and/or alcohol as well. 121 None of the reported policies have 
identified anabolic steroids even though the policy includes 
athletic as well as non-athletic participants. 122 
Cost is a factor in determining the substances to be tested 
for, and school boards will need to consider carefully at the 
outset what kind of investment they are willing to make. 
Boards would be free to reduce the numbers of students if cost 
becomes an issue, but they need to be aware that reducing 
numbers may be viewed by parents and students as a reduction 
in priority. 
The two general methods of testing are the enzyme 
multiplied immunoassay technique (EMIT) and Gas 
Chromatography (CG-MS). EMIT is the usual test for many 
drugs such as amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, opiates and 
phencyclidine (PCP). The cost for screening these drugs is $20 
to $50. Testing for alcohol, nicotine (tobacco), and LSD 
normally adds another $10 per substance per screening test. 
Including anabolic steroids increases the cost of the test to $80 
to $120 per test. 123 Using EMIT to test for these substances 
increases the cost of the test package because it requires 
separate analysis of individual additives in each of the 
118. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267; Todd, 983 F. Supp. at 802. To this list, the 
district policy in Linke, 763 N.E.2d 972, added methadone, methaqualone, and 
propoxyphene. 
119. Metabolites are waste products of the metabolic process that are toxic to the 
body. Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary 413 (1995). 
120. See Miller, 172 F.3d at 576. 
121. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d at 942; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1054; Todd, 
133 F.3d at 984 (tested for both alcohol and tobacco/nicotine); Miller, 172 F.3d at 576 
(alcohol only). 
122. Athletics may involve testing for performance enhancing substances that do 
not apply to the general student population. See e.g. Schul v. Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d 
877 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (a coach was suspended for recommending to a track athlete that 
he consume caffeine prior to a meet in order to increase performance). 
123. Natl. Fedn. of St. High Sch. Assn., Drug Testing in School Activities 
<http://www.nfhs.org/sportsmed/drug_testing4.htm> (last accessed May 16, 2002). 
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particular drugs. For example, tobacco requires a separate test 
for the additive nicotine. 
3. Designation of Activities Covered 
Although the policy in Earls addressed only competitive 
extracurricular activities, 124 there is no reason to believe that 
school districts could not extend testing to all extracurricular 
activities. 125 The only caveat is that application of random 
testing to all students will probably fail if it does not also 
satisfy the individualized reasonable susp1c10n test of 
Vernonia. 126 In Todd, Joy, and Linke, school districts extended 
their drug testing policy to students who drove to school and 
there is nothing in Earls to suggest that such an application of 
a policy would be unconstitutional. 
Under Earls, defining the groups to be tested does not 
appear to require a direct relationship between the students 
using drugs and the students selected for testing. If evidence 
of drug use is required, it need only be general anecdotal 
evidence of drug use within the school at large. 
4. Requirement of Consent Form 
In order to participate in extracurricular activities, each 
student and their parents should be required to sign a consent 
form. Failure to sign the form renders the student ineligible to 
participate until the form is signed. In Joy, the court 
recognized the consent form as serving three purposes: (1) it 
provided notice that random drug testing would occur; (2) it 
authorized the school to administer random drug tests; and (3) 
124. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267 (the policy included such extracurricular activities 
as FFA, FHA, and Porn Porn, but the school applied the policy only to state athletic 
association sanctioned activities). In Linke, the district's policy included co-curricular 
activities that were extensions of curricular classes and involved credits or grades. 
Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975. 
125. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (all extracurricular activities were 
covered); Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975 (all athletics and certain specified extracurricular 
and co-curricular activities were covered). In Todd, 133 F.3d at 984, besides athletics, 
the school district defined certain extracurricular activities to include "Student 
Council, Foreign Language Clubs, Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Future Farmers of 
America [FFA] and the Library Club." One of the plaintiffs in Todd was prohibited 
from videotaping the football game because he refused to sign the consent form. !d. at 
985. In Miller, 172 F.3d at 577, the policy extended to such activities as "Radio Club, 
prom committees, the quiz bowl, and school dances." 
126. See Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919. 
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it was written indicia of the student's voluntary choice to 
participate in activities covered by the drug testing policy .127 
While school policies in case law require both the student's 
and parent's signatures, they do not address whether a 
student's signature without a parent's is sufficient to require 
that the school permit the student to participate in 
extracurricular activities. Although an argument can be made 
in certain contexts that a student may have rights in school 
settings independent from the parent, 128 such should not be the 
case where participation in school activities may subject the 
student to the possibility of injury and the school to the 
possibility of parental litigation for permitting the student to 
participate without parental consent. 129 
The absence of a consent form would normally keep 
students from participating in extracurricular activities. 
However, the school district policy in Linke struck an 
interesting balance for students in co-curricular activities -
those activities outside the normal school day that were 
extensions of classes for which credit or grades were earned. 
Those students who chose not to participate in the testing 
program were given alternative assignments for academic 
credit in lieu of participating in public performances. 130 
Linke reflects the delicate balance addressed by Justice 
Thomas in Earls, namely that enforcement of the school 
district's policy did not affect attendance at school. Assuming 
Earls will be read broadly to say that evidence of suspicionless 
searches cannot be used to suspend or expel from school, will 
that prohibition apply to academic penalties, as those in Linke, 
flowing from removal from extracurricular activities? The 
uncertainty in Earls regarding the application of suspicionless 
searches to non-extracurricular participation suggests that 
schools may need to adjust penalties, as was done in Linke, 
where both extracurricular participation and grades in courses 
are connected. 
127. The consent form generally refers to the school activities covered by the 
testing policy as privileges, not rights. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1055. 
128. See Baker u. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 
423 U.S. 907 (1975) (parent did not have a liberty clause right to prohibit use of 
corporal punishment in her son's school but her son had a liberty clause in his own 
right to challenge the use of corporal punishment against him). 
129. See generally Ralph Mawdslcy, Parents' Rights to Direct Their Children's 
Education, 162 Ed. L. Rep. 659 (2002). 
130. 763 N.E.2d at 975. 
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5. Procedure for Selecting Students 
An important part of the drug testing process is the 
procedure by which students are selected. Unfortunately, this 
procedure is not elaborated upon in most of the reported cases. 
However, a few cases indicate that the procedure for randomly 
selecting students is accomplished according to criteria related 
to the frequency of testing131 and the number of students to be 
selected. 132 In Linke, the school district contracted with a 
private testing firm that used a computer program to randomly 
select individuals for testing and then provided those names to 
the school principals. 133 Students were not provided advance 
notice of the testing. 
All suspicionless drug testing policies would have to 
determine a random basis for the testing consistent with their 
purpose of deterring drug use and drug-related injuries. 134 
Without a system for determining randomness, schools would 
run the risk that drug testing might lose its suspicionless 
character and appear to be targeting specific individuals. Once 
specific students are targeted for testing, school officials would 
lose the basis for suspicionless testing and would have to 
demonstrate a reasonable suspicion for their testing. 135 
6. Collecting Samples 
Collection of urine samples for testing follows specific steps 
set forth in each school district's policy. Although the steps may 
vary somewhat among policies, the following summary of the 
three important steps of collecting samples represents a collage 
131. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650 (ten percent of athletes per week during the 
sport's season); Theodore, 261 A.2d at 654 (test administered monthly to five percent of 
participating students). 
132. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311 (athletes were assigned numbers and one 
student was selected for testing); Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267 (students called out of 
classrooms in groups of two and three). 
133. 763 F.2d at 975. 
134. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 985 (student survey indicated drug use had increased 
prior to the implementation of a random drug testing policy and drug use had caused 
death and injury to several students); Joy, 212 F.3d at 1055 (drug testing of students 
driving to school relied on studies and newspaper articles on students under the 
influence of alcohol involved in automobile accidents). 
135. See Willis, 158 F.3d 415 (school policy requiring students suspended to not be 
readmitted without a drug test failed under special needs test, the basis for random 
testing, because school officials had a basis for determining reasonable suspicion when 
they met with the student in a disciplinary hearing). 
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of various policies. 136 First, prior to taking the sample, the 
person responsible for collecting the sample 137 accompanies the 
student to a stall in a restroom, flushes the toilet, and applies a 
dye to the water in the toilet.l38 This person of the same 
gender as the student may provide the student an opportunity, 
either prior to or just after the sample has been provided, to list 
all medications taken by the student. 139 Second, the school 
official waits outside the stall while the student provides the 
sample and then may test the temperature of the urine. 140 
Either the student, or the school official in the presence of the 
student, seals the container. Both the student and official sign 
a form attached to the sample to begin the chain of custody. 
Third, assuming that the test is not being administered by a 
representative of the testing agency, the sample is carried to an 
appropriate school official responsible for transmitting it to the 
testing agency. 141 This official signs the custody form and 
transmits the sample to the designated testing agency where 
the persons receiving the sample and performing the test sign 
the form. 142 
Collecting information about a student's medications raises 
a privacy interest for students because this information may be 
136. The most comprehensive test administration is found in Schaill, 864 F.2d at 
1311. 
137. This person can be a faculty member (Earls), a representative of a private 
testing agency (Linke), a health paraprofessional (Penn-Harris-Madison), or a school 
nurse (Theodore). 
138. In Joy, the student leaves all outer garments, bags and purses outside the 
collection facility. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1057. See also Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976. 
139. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268; Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 (in both cases 
a student is given the opportunity to list medications on a form to be transmitted to the 
testing agency that is placed in a sealed envelope and not viewed by school district 
employees). Another option to providing the information at the time of testing is to 
wait until a positive test is reported and then allow the student to submit 
documentation that would justifY a positive result. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975. 
140. See Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1099. 
141. Compare Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976 (testing agency employee takes charge of 
sample and carries it to the laboratory), with Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d 940 
(sample is temporarily stored at school until transmitted to laboratory). 
142. Identification of the persons who must be called as witnesses to provide 
appropriate foundation to introduce the results of drug testing into evidence at a school 
board hearing depends on the qualifications of the person taking the sample and the 
employment relationship between the person performing the test and the testing 
facility. See Arriola v. Orleans Parish Sch. Ed., 809 So. 2d 232 (La. 2002) (testimony of 
phlebotomist who took urine sample was sufficient to form basis for foundation to 
introduce testing results where that person was also employed by the testing 
laboratory). 
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indicative of a disease or medical condition. 143 In Vernonia, the 
school district's random drug testing policy was silent as to who 
was to receive the medication lists. The Supreme Court 
interpreted the district's policy as implying that medication 
lists would be sent by sealed envelope to the testing service, 144 
under the principle that "disclosure to teachers and coaches -
persons who personally know the student - is a greater 
invasion of privacy."145 Justice Thomas in Earls considered 
this matter of privacy differently and found a choir teacher's 
examination of a choir member's drug list not to be a problem 
because the teacher would need to know that information when 
the students are performing off-campus, and, in any case, the 
teacher would have had access to this kind of information 
before the policy was developed. If a reconciliation of Vernonia 
and Earls is possible, it would seem to be that Earls prevents 
whatever privacy rights a student may have had under 
Vernonia from limiting access by those persons in a public 
school who have "a legitimate educational interest" in knowing 
about the student.146 Presumably, access to school personnel 
who have a "need to know" is not a problem, as long as the 
information is not revealed to those who do not have this need 
to know. 147 
What Earls and Vernonia do not address is the remedy that 
a student might have where confidential information regarding 
the medication list (or drug testing results) is revealed to 
persons, such as other students, who have no need-to-know. In 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga University v. 
Doe, 148 whereby FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of 
action, aggrieved students would seem to be left only with a 
common law invasion of privacy action. 
143. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (Court observed that the test is looking only for 
drugs, "not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic"). 
144. See id. at 660. 
145. !d. at 659 (emphasis in original). 
146. See FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(l)(A). 
147. In Earls, Justice Thomas addressed an allegation that a student might have 
seen another student's medication list with the observation that "one example of 
alleged carelessness hardly increases the character of the intrusion." 122 S. Ct. at 
2566. 
148. 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002) (the Court also abrogated the Tenth Circuit's decision 
in Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1203 (lOth Cir. 2000), determining that 
a private cause of action existed under FERPA for damages; the Supreme Court in 
reversing the Tenth Circuit in Falvo had addressed only the issue as to whether 
education records under FERPA included student grades in a classroom). 
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7. Testing Samples 
The agency with whom the school board has contracted 
performs the test for the substances identified in the school's 
policy. The policy generally provides that the agency's test will 
be performed only on a portion of the sample, saving the rest 
for a retest in the event of a positive result. 149 Policies can vary 
as to the tests to be performed at the expense of the school 
district. Generally, the EMIT is the one performed because it 
identifies the largest number of drugs at the least expensive 
cost. In the event of a positive result, the policy can provide for 
a retest at school expense with the same test150 or the more 
expensive gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) 
method. 151 However, a policy may provide instead that 
students with a positive EMIT test can request a GC/MS test at 
their own expense. 152 
Consent to test for a specific group of substances does not 
authorize school officials to request a test for a substance not 
identified in its drug testing policy. Even if a student has a 
diminished constitutional privacy right that permits random 
drug testing, that privacy does not exceed the consent granted. 
A student whose sample has been tested for a substance not 
designated in the policy may still retain a state invasion of 
privacy claim for unauthorized testing. 153 
8. Report of Positive Test Results 
Positive test results are reported to a designated school 
official and are shared with other school personnel on a need-
to-know basis. 154 Although cases are vague as to who has a 
need-to-know, the list would presumably include the school 
official responsible for arranging a meeting with the student's 
parents. The school official responsible for discipline may be 
149. See e.g. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 654, n. 6. 
150. See Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975; Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d at 943. 
151. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311; Theodore, 761 A.2d at 654. 
152. Miller, 172 F.3d at 577 n. 3. 
153. See Doe u. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1998) (student who 
gave consent for rubella test had invasion of privacy claim where school official had 
instructed testing agency to test for HIV as well). 
154. See e.g. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 988, n. 12 (results for tests of athletes were 
provided to "the athletic director, student assessment team, substance abuse 
professional, guidance counselor, coach and/or advisor"); Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 
N.E.2d at 943 (school staff is provided information only on a need-to-know basis). 
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included in those who need-to-know where that person must 
coordinate penalties in the school policy. In instances where a 
student will be removed from programs in which they have 
been participating, appropriate coaches and advisors could be 
included in the category of those who need-to-know. 155 Clearly, 
if the student affected is a special education student whose 
participation in an activity is part of an IEP, the IEP team 
members will need to know if student discipline is 
contemplated, removal from an activity is required, or a 
manifestation hearing needs to be conducted.l56 
The basic issue to be considered in determining who should 
be informed of the test results is one of student expectation of 
privacy. In addition to a student's expectation of privacy in 
the medications taken which were mentioned earlier, the 
student probably has an expectation of privacy regarding 
disclosure of test results. 157 In Vernonia, the Court was 
comfortable with a standard that permitted disclosure of 
results "only to a limited class of school personnel who have a 
need to know .... ,"158 a standard not significantly different 
from disclosure of education records under the Family 
Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) to a person "with 
legitimate educational interests."159 
9. Defenses to a Positive Test 
Drug testing policies need to provide that parents of 
students testing positive for prohibited substances will be 
notified and that at a parent conference with a designated 
school official they will have an opportunity to explain the 
positive results. If they have not previously done so, students 
155. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2566 (if a choir director had a "need-to-know" a 
student's medication list, presumably that same director could know the results of a 
drug test). 
156. Athletics can have unique protected status for students with disabilities. For 
an example of a case where a court ordered an IEP permitting athletic participation 
even though the student had reached the age of 19 and state athletic association rules 
prohibited 19-year-old students from participating, see Kling v. Mentor Pub. Sch. Dist., 
136 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D. Ohio 2001). For an example of a case where a manifestation 
hearing must be held to determine whether an IEP can be rewritten, see Parent v. 
Osceola County Sch. Bd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Fla. 1999). 
157. See Penn-Harris-Madison, 768 N.E.2d at 943 (policy provides that school 
officials with access to the test results are specifically prohibited from divulging those 
results to anyone other than the student, except under court order). 
158. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. 
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(1)(A). 
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can provide a list of medications (or an amended list) that they 
are taking, 160 or a statement of activities that might account for 
the positive result. 161 This list of medications and/or 
explanations would then be submitted to the testing agency to 
determine whether any of them could account for the positive 
result. A policy may also permit parents to have the remaining 
portion of the urine sample tested at an agency of their 
choice 162 or permit the student to be retested within 24 hours of 
receiving a positive result. 163 
10. Penalties for Positive Test Results 
The standard penalty for a positive test is removal from 
extracurricular activities. Policies differ regarding student 
reinstatement with the time ranging from as soon as the 
student tests negative on a subsequent test164 to the end of a 
prescribed period of time 165 or a specified number of 
activities. 166 In addition to removal, a student could also be 
required to participate in a drug assessment program.l67 In 
Todd, a student who tested positive twice was deemed to have 
given the school reasonable suspicion justifying further drug 
testing even though the student was no longer permitted to 
engage in extracurricular activities. 168 With the exception of 
Joy, penalties are limited to suspension from activities covered 
by the policy and do not include exclusion from school 
attendance .169 
160. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 984. 
161. For an interesting higher education case involving an attempted explanation 
for a positive test for anabolic steroid testosterone, see Brennan v. Bd. of Trustees for U. 
of La. Sys., 691 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1997) (student unsuccessfully alleged that his high 
testosterone level had been due to sexual activity the night before the test). 
162. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1057. 
163. See Miller, 172 F. 3d at 577, n. 3. 
164. See Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976. 
165. Miller, 172 F.3d at 577 (a student is placed on probation for 20 days, and then 
if tested positive again, is banned for one year). 
166. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311 (the first positive test results in suspension from 
30% of athletic contests, a second test results in a 50% suspension, a third results in 
suspicion for a full calendar year, and a fourth positive results in the student being 
barred from all interscholastic activities for his/her high school career). 
167. Theodore, 761 A.2d at 655. 
168. Todd, 133 F.3d at 985. 
169. See Scha.ill, 864 F.2d at 1319 ("No student will be suspended or expelled from 
school."); Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268 ("There are not academic sanctions imposed."); but see 
.Joy, 212 F. 3d at 1056 n. 4 (where a positive test can be treated as a disciplinary offense 
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Discipline that is considered preventative and 
rehabilitative, as opposed to punitive, has a better chance of 
surviving constitutional challenge. In Linke, the court 
determined that a policy that removed students from 
extracurricular activities for varying periods of time was 
"preventative or rehabilitative," while a policy (not at issue in 
the case) that would remove a student from school would be 
considered punitive. 170 The implication is that non-punitive 
policies mitigate more against a student's privacy interest. 
Whether the results of a positive test are reported to law 
enforcement authorities varies. In Earls, the testing policy 
provided that test results "shall be disclosed only to those 
school personnel who have a need to know and will not be 
turned over to any law enforcement authorities." 171 However, 
in Joy, the Student Handbook required a report to be made to 
law enforcement authorities 172 and, in Linke, results were not 
revealed to juvenile authorities "absent binding legal 
compulsion." 173 
Of the three kinds of penalties, exclusion from the school 
extracurricular activity, exclusion from attendance at school, 
and exposure to criminal prosecution, the first is the easiest to 
defend. If the drug testing policy states a nexus between 
student health/safety and drug use, removing the student from 
participation seems to satisfy the purpose of the policy. 174 
Removing a student from school, however, presents the issue of 
a student's property interest in education175 and raises the 
question whether removing a student from an activity for the 
leading to possible suspension or expulsion from the school). 
170. 763 N.E.2d at 982. 
171. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268_ For cases with policies in agreement with F:arls, see 
also Theodore, 761 A.2d at 662; Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1100 (results disbursed to 
designated school officials only)_ 
172. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1056 n. 4. 
173. 763 N.E.2d at 975. 
17 4. Generally, students do not have property interests in extracurricular 
activities. However, such a property interest might exist where school documents 
establishing the programs create an entitlement. See Butler u. Oak Creek-Franklin 
Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Wis. 2001). 
175. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (Court held that a state's 
compulsory attendance law created "a student's legitimate entitlement to a public 
education as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and 
which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum 
procedures required by that Clause")_ 
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purpose of safety/health protection also applies to the general 
academic setting. 
In Trinidad School District v. Lopez, 176 the Colorado 
Supreme Court invalidated a random drug testing policy that 
would have resulted in a student being suspended from an 
extracurricular activity (marching band) as well as receiving a 
failing grade in a for-credit instrumental class that required 
participation in the marching band. For the court, the 
suspicionless drug testing policy failed because it "swept within 
its reach students participating in an extracurricular activity 
who were not demonstrated to play a role in promoting drugs 
and for whom there was no demonstrated risk of physical 
injury, [as well as] ... includ[ing] students enrolled in a for-
credit class offered by the District." 177 In essence, removing a 
student from an academic course and awarding a failing grade 
takes the justification for random testing out of the arena of 
voluntary participation. 
Once the student has been removed from an activity 
because of health/safety reasons or because of failure to be a 
role model, one can argue that the school has taken the results 
of suspicionless testing as far as it can go without additional 
information, such as that the continued presence of the student 
in school represents a risk to other students. However, such a 
risk is not a conclusion that school officials can make based on 
suspicionless testing; for that, they must look to individualized 
suspicion of the student's behavior in the classroom setting. To 
use evidence from a suspicionless search of a student involved 
in an extracurricular activity, justified because extracurricular 
activities are privileges, as the basis for removing a student 
from attendance at school, grounded in a state-created right of 
compulsory attendance, seems not only inappropriate, but also 
a violation of a student's property right in school attendance. 
Reporting students with positive tests to law enforcement 
officials assumes that the positive result reflects a violation of 
state or local law. Clearly, school officials can turn over 
evidence secured from reasonable suspicion searches to law 
enforcement. 178 One can argue that, assuming a suspicionless 
176. 963 P.2d 1095. 
177. /d. at 1110. 
178. See e.g. F.S.E. u. State, 99:{ P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. J\pp. 1999) (marijuana 
found in student's car as a result of reasonable suspicion search could be used in 
juvenile proceeding). 
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search is lawful, the same result should apply. However, the 
Supreme Court in Vernonia pointedly noted that test results in 
that case "[were] not turned over to law enforcement 
authorities ... "179 and a similar observation was made in 
Earls. 180 Both decisions appear to suggest that disclosure to 
law enforcement goes to the privacy interest of students and 
that school officials need more evidence in a suspicionless 
search than just positive test results before being permitted to 
turn evidence over to law enforcement.181 Because a 
suspicionless search represents a lower search standard than 
individualized reasonable suspicion, school officials may need 
evidence that the student is more than just a drug testing 
policy violator and represents, in addition, a risk to other 
students. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Prior to Earls, courts had been reluctant to support random 
drug testing where there was no evidence of a serious drug 
problem and where those being tested were not the persons 
contributing to the drug problem. Some courts refused to find 
a basis to support suspicionless testing where the students 
being tested did not have the same health and safety risks of 
physical injury as did athletes. Earls has made clear under the 
Fourth Amendment that schools do not have to wait until they 
have evidence of a drug problem in order to institute a random 
drug testing policy. However, whether states will apply that 
standard in interpreting their own constitutions remains to be 
seen. 
Judicial concern for the privacy rights of students has a 
troubling side. Public school officials are charged with 
maintaining a safe school environment. Suspicionless random 
drug testing, which involves minimal inconvenience to 
179. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. 
180. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2566. 
181. In a non-education case, Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court 
refused to lower the level of privacy protection for home occupants from police use of 
infrared scanners. The notion that Jaw enforcement officers must have probable cause 
to scan a person's house may have implications for privacy generally. Arguably, school 
law enforcement officials should not have access to information that is normally 
protected by confidentiality without meeting the standard of individualized reasonable 
suspicion. Attempting to access this information through the suspicionless testing or 
language in a consent form may be challengeable as an invasion of privacy. 
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students, provides an easily administered process with both 
specific and general outcomes. Specifically, the school, by tying 
extracurricular activity participation to testing, has a 
mechanism both for discouraging drug use and penalizing 
those who do use drugs without removing them from academic 
programs. In general, a random drug testing policy sends a 
message to parents and taxpayers that the school district is 
genuinely concerned with preventing drug use. 182 Indeed, 
parents may demand drug testing for their school district, 
perhaps placing school officials who may not want to address 
legal issues associated with testing in a difficult position. How 
can school officials be opposed to student drug use and not use 
a legal remedy in drug testing that is available to them? 
Drug testing may not be the only remedy available to school 
officials in deterring drug use, but schools do not have an 
infinite continuum of alternatives. Even with the legal issues 
associated with random testing, development of a random 
testing policy represents action against drug use. A random 
testing policy that succeeds in preventing drug use would 
appear to be more effective in promoting the well-being of a 
school, its students, and teachers than a drug use crisis that 
may take years to resolve. 
182. E.g. Linke, N.E.2d at 981 (the court remarks that "parents may be reluctant 
to allow their children to participate in voluntary school activities if schools are not 
permitted to take the reasonable steps taken [by the school district in the case] to 
prevent drug use"). 
